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ARGUMENT

POINT ONE. The Trial Court's Decision to Rescind its Acceptance of the Plea in
Abeyance was not justified. A violation of a Statute DOES NOT Constitute Manifest
Injustice.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Kay, 1X1 p.2d 1294 (Utah 1986) is the governing case
law in this appeal.
In Kay, a defendant was charged with a capital offense of murder. The defendant's attorney
approached the trial judge about the possibility of entering into a plea agreement. The attorney
proposed that his client plead guilty in exchange for the court agreeing to impose a sentence of life
imprisonment. The proposal was made in the presence of the prosecutor and the court agreed. It
was clear that the acceptance by the trial court of the defendant's plea violated the statute governing
the sentencing of capital felons and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (in that a judge
became involved in plea negotiations). Kay, 111 P.2d at 1296. Thereafter, the state sought to set
aside the defendant's plea and the defendant appealed.
On appeal, the Court stated the grounds under which a plea could be set aside by the court.
Specifically, the Kay Court adopted the following as a correct statement of the law.
[J]eopardy attaches upon the acceptance of the guilty plea, but [the
constitution] allow[s] the trial court to rescind its acceptance at any
time before sentencing and judgment upon a showing of "manifest
1

necessity" ~ the standard for declaring a mistrial over the defendant's
objection. (Emphasis added).
Kay, at page 1303.

The state's has erroneously argued that the trial court was justified in rescinding the plea
agreement of the defendant because the plea was in violation of a statute. Defendant, as argued in
his opening brief, does not believe that the plea was in violation of statute. However, even if it were,
a violation of a statute does not per se amount to manifest injustice. Indeed, in the Kay case, the
Supreme Court found that the defendant's plea was made in violation of Rule 11 and in violation of
the statute governing the sentencing of capital felons. Such violations, however, did not render the
plea invalid. Specifically the Court held the following.
We hold that neither the statute governing the sentencing of capital
offenses nor Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
prevented Kay from entering and the trial judge from accepting the
conditional plea presented here. We hold that the trial judge did
violate the procedural requirements of Rule 11 when he accepted
Kay's unilateral plea, butfindthat the violation did not render the plea
agreement invalid. . . .
ATayatpage 1296.
The Kay Court did agree that the trial court was justified in rescinding its promise to sentence
the defendant to life but only because the whole plea negotiation proposal was that of the defendant
and there was apparently no acquiescence by the State. In this case the plea bargain was agreed to
by both the State and the defendant. Under the reasoning of Kay, the plea bargain should not have
been rescinded by the trial court as a violation of a statute does not per se amount to a manifest
injustice.

2

Further evidence that the violation of a statute is not grounds to rescind a plea can be found
in the Kay Court's dicta in footnote ten wherein the court stated.
We recognize that Utah's Rule 11 provides that "if the judge [after
accepting a plea] decides that final disposition should not be handled
in conformity with the plea agreement, he shall so advise the
defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or
withdraw the plea." It may be contended that this provision gives a
trial judge carte blanche to withdraw from a plea bargain at any time.
However, it is elementary that neither rule nor statute may
override a defendant's constitutional right to not be placed twice in
jeopardy. If a court attempted to withdraw from a plea agreement
over a defendant's objection and in the absence of circumstances
warranting a misplea, constitutional prohibitions against double
jeopardy would preclude his further prosecution. (Emphasis added).
Xqyatpate 1310

POINT TWO. The Plea in Abeyance was not Void at the Time it was Entered.
The State has erroneously argues that the plea was void at the time it was entered because
it violated Utah Coded Annotated 77-2a-3(7). However, the idea that a violation of a statue renders
a plea to be void was the identical argument that the State made in the Kay case which argument was
specifically rejected by the Court. Indeed, the Court after finding that the plea had violated Rule 11
stated that ". . . we cannot hold that this violation of Rule 11 requires that the plea be declared a
nullity. . . ." Kay, 111 P.2d at page 1301.

POINT THREE. Having shown that the trial court accepted defendant's plea, it is
incumbent on the State to show a manifest necessity existed for setting aside the plea.
The only argument presented by the state that a manifest necessity existed for setting aside

3

the plea is that is violated statute. As outlined above and stated by the Kay Court, a violation of a
statute is not proper grounds for setting aside a plea. Since the state has presented no other argument
that would show the existence of a manifest necessity, there can be not other result than for this Court
to find that the trial court was in error when it rescinded the plea agreement.

POINT FOUR The plea in abeyance was proper as there is no evidence that pleas in
abeyance were not recognized prior to the 1993 enactment
The state argues that pleas in abeyance were not formally recognized in this jurisdiction until
they were authorized in Title 77, Chapter 2a of the Utah Code enacted in 1993 and consequently the
defendant had norightto such a plea because the acts complained of occurred, in part, prior to May
3, 1993. However, the state gives no citation to support its argument that a plea in abeyance was not
a right of the defendant nor evidence that pleas in abeyance were not recognized by Utah courts prior
to the 1993 enactment. Certainly, the state can't be implying that pleas in abeyance were not used
by Utah courts prior to 1993. Obviously, pleas in abeyance were in use well before the 1993
enactment.

CONCLUSION
The plea in abeyance was accepted by the trial court. In order to rescind the plea, the state
must show a manifest necessity. The only argument made regarding a manifest necessity is that the
plea was violative of a statute. Under the reasoning set forth in Kay, a violation of a statute is not
grounds for a showing of manifest necessity. Accordingly, the plea should not have been rescinded
and the case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to enforce the plea in abeyance
4

and to set aside defendant's subsequent plea of guilty to the first degree felony.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of May, 1996.
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David C. Cundick
Attorney for defendant/appellant
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